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Dennis Kendig 
Discrimination Against Women 
in Home Mortgage Financing 
In the last few years, the women's rights 
movement has directed national atten-
tion to a variety of areas in which women 
are assigned a subordinate status. One of 
these areas is the extension of credit. 
Unlike men, women are frequently re-
quired to obtain co-signers for small 
loans and married women are often 
unable to obtain charge accounts except 
under their husband's names. The largest 
credit transaction the average person 
ever faces is the purchase of a home. In 
this area too, there have been claims of 
discrimination against women. 
The claims of discrimination have cen-
tered on the practice of lenders not to 
count all of a working wife's income 
when she applies with her husband for 
a mortgage. Since lenders use a formula 
based on a family's income to determine 
whether to make the loan or how large a 
loan to make, the result of omitting the 
wife's earnings is that the family will be 
offered a smaller loan, or none at all. 
Lenders have also been accused of being 
less likely to lend to a single woman than 
to a man. This report is the result of a 
detailed investigation into the bases for 
these claims. 
These claims of discrimination have 
broad ramifications, for bias against 
women in home mortgage financing 
constitutes a serious barrier to the 
achievement of social and economic 
justice in the United States. Not only 
is the extension of mortgage credit often 
crucial to social advancement, but minor-
ity and poor families are disproportion-
ately disadvataged by discrimination 
against women. 
Mortgage lending institutions bear a 
heavy social responsibility to behave 
fairly in their lending activities for 
several reasons. First, the Housing Act 
of 1949 set as a national goal "a decent 
home and a suitable living environment 
for every family." 1 Mortgage lenders 
who unfairly discount the income of a 
working wife, thus disqualifying the fam-
ily for a loan, or who treat single women 
differently from men are wrongly deny-
ing these people a home of their choice. 
Second, the number of people affected is 
very great. Literally millions of working 
couples and single women encounter un-
justifiable obstacles in their quest for 
home ownership. 2 Third, for most fam-
ilies the purchase of a home is the largest 
credit transaction they will ever encounter 
and one to which a very high social 
priority is attached. 
The ability to obtain mortgage credit 
to purchase a home can mean much 
more to a family than merely the 
adequacy of its shelter. It can mean 
living in a decent neighborhood, having 
access to good educational, health and 
recreational facilities, or even access to a 
decent job. This magnifies the import-
ance of fair mortgage lending practices. 3 
The practice of income discounting is 
especially harmful to the home owner-
ship aspirations of America's minority 
families. In black families it is more 
common for both partners to work. In 
1969, among families in which the hus-
band's income was $10,000 or more, 
half of the black wives, but only 1 /3 of 
the white wives, were in the labor force. 
Forty-four per cent of black wives with 
preschool schildren were in the labor 
force compared to 28 per cent of white 
wives.4 Bureau of Labor Statistics data 
indicates that the labor force participa-
tion rate for nonwhite wives is 52.5%, 
contrasted with 39.7% for white wives. 
In the key age group 25-34, the corre-
sponding percentages are 59.4% and 
38.0%.5 Moreover; these working wives 
account for a substantial proportion of 
family income-26 per cent in the average 
family. 6 For families where the wife's 
income makes the difference between 
poverty and an acceptable living standard, 
the results of discriminatory practices can 
be devastating: the exclusion of the 
wife's income can effectively shut the 
minority couple out of the new home 
market. 7 
Similarly, single minority women are dis-
proportionately harmed by arbitrary 
treatment compared to single white 
women because relatively more black 
women than white women participate in 
the labor force. In 1971, 42.6% of white 
women and 49 .2% of nonwhite women 
were working. 8 This is true because a 
higher proportion of black women are 
separated, divorced, or widowed and must 
rely heavily on their own earnings for 
their support.9 
In exploring the problem of sex discrim-
ination in home loan financing, this 
report will be divided into three parts. 
Part I discusses the extent of discrimina-
tion against women in this field. It con-
cluded that such discrimination is wide-
spread and takes two forms. First, lenders 
discount a working wife's income when 
she applies with her husband for a home 
mortgage. Second, lenders are less likely 
to make a loan to a single woman than to 
a man. 
Part II analyzes the lenders' arguments 
that these discriminatory practices may be 
justified on economic grounds. It con-
cludes that there is no economic justifica-
tion for automatically discriminating 
against women applicants for mortgages 
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and suggests that lenders should solicit 
more precise data from applicant~ in order 
to evaluate more objectively the likelihood 
of default or foreclosure. 
Part III argues that present federal and 
state remedies are inadequate to prevent 
these forms of discrimination. The 
possible impact of the Equal Rights 
Amendment is also analyzed. The con-
clusion is reached that the various states 
should adopt statutes directed at elimi-
nating discrimination against women in 
home mortgage financing. 
Following the text of the report is a 
proposed state statute designed to 
prevent a wide fange1 of discrimination 
against women in credit transactions. 
·Dennis Kendig is a third-year student at 
Yale Law School. His article was originally 
prepared as a report for Yale Legislative 
Services. 
I The Pattern of Discrimination 
A Income Discounting 
The most common form of discrimination against 
women in home mortgage financing is the practice by 
lenders of discounting a married woman's income when 
she applies with her husband for a home mortgage. 
Lenders, in determining the amount of the loan 6ey are 
willing to make, rely heavily on the income of the loan 
applicant. Because lenders believe the percentage of its 
income a family spends on housing to be an important 
determinant of loan risk, the greater the family income, 
the larger loan they are willing to grant. With few ex-
ceptions, lenders refuse to count 100 per cent of a work-
ing wife's income when computing family income, thus 
reducing the amount of the loan for which the applicant 
is eligible. 
Evidence that this policy of discounting a wife's income 
is widespread comes from a variety of sources. Discount-
ing is typically recommended in textbooks and treatises 
on mortgage lending. Hoagland's treatise on Real Estate 
Finance, while noting that the income of children 
should not be counted toward a borrower's resources, 
did not even mention the possibility of a wife's having 
an income.1° The idea that a wife might have an income 
was acknowledged in the 1962 edition of Bryant's text-
book, Mortgage Lending, but only in the following 
context: 
Only the net income of the family as 
stated above should be taken into con-
sideration, and the income of a wife 
under thirty-five years of age should 
not be considered.11 
By 1965, the author of the "Analysis of the Borrower" 
section in Pease and Kerwood's Mortgage Banking had 
to take notice of 
the trend in modern families ... toward an 
increasing frequency of supplemental income 
beyond the primary wage earner's main job.12 
However, the author apparently assumed that the pri-
mary wage earner would be male and noted that many 
wives found the additional expense necessary to main-
tain a household while working too great in proportion 
to their earnings to justify working for long periods, and 167 
that many wives left business life to raise their families. 
His conclusion: 
This does not mean that their income 
should be totally overlooked. It does 
mean that such income should be con-
sidered relatively temporary in nature.13 
With this emphasis in the literature on discounting a 
working wife's income, it is not surprising to find that 
many lenders have adopted a policy of discounting. 
Such is the case with commercial lenders across the 
nation. 
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1 Commercial Lenders 
Responding to a reader's inquiry, Bernard Meltzer, an 
expert on personal finance, reported in his column in 
the Washington Post that he had surveyed many mort-
gage lenders to ascertain their policy regarding recog-
nizing a wife's income. 14 Assuring them anonymity in 
order to get his information, Meltzer discovered a 
general pattern in lending practices. In marriages of 
less than five years or where the wife had been work-
ing only a short time, no recognition was given to her 
income. With young married couples, no matter 
what their background, the wife's income was not 
recognized. If the wife was classified as a professional 
and was between the ages of 26 and 35, a lender 
might give half credit to her income. Over 35 years 
of age, it was customary to give full credit. If the 
wife was classified in a non-professional occupation, 
usually no allowance was made for her income up to 
age 35, half allowance between 35 and 42, and full 
credit beyond that age. 
The Center for National Policy Review, a privately 
funded organization based at Catholic University Law 
School, has for some time been concerned with 
national policy relating to civil rights and urban 
problems. Staff member Steven Rohde, testifying 
before the National Commission on Consumer Finance, 
presented the Center's conclusions after their investi-
gation of the problem of income discounting. The 
evidence indicated that conventional mortgage under-
writing practices with regard to a wife's income were 
extremely diverse, but that only a few lenders were 
normally willing to give full credit to a wife's income.15 
Similar evidence comes from representatives of local 
lending institutions. 16 
More evidence comes from a recent survey of the 
savings and loan industry. The Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board conducted a survey of lending practices of 
savings and loan associations which included questions 
directed at this subject.17 As one question, the asso-
ciations were asked what credit they would allow for 
a working wife's income if she were age 25, had two 
school age schildren, and worked full time as a sec-
retary. Twenty-five per cent of the respondents 
stated they would count none of her income and 63% 
stated they would count half or less. Only 22% of 
the responding institutions would have counted all of 
her income. 18 
2 V.A Practice 
The Veterans Administration also appears to give little 
weight to a working wife's income. Although the 
V.A. does not maintain records of the \\eight given 
wife's income, evidence that the weight is generally 
low comes from individuals who have applied for 
V.A. loans and from realtors who have attempted to 
help such customers. 
In general, it seems that unless a· wife 
of child-bearing age has a long work 
history and can produce a doctor's 
certificate stating that she cannot bear 
children, her income will be largely 
disregarded .19 
The following excerpt from testimony before the 
National Commission on Consumer Finance offers 
an illustration of how this policy can result in 
economically qualified applicants being denied loans. 
Mrs. Johnson is 29 years old, and works full 
time for the Dade County Department of 
Housing and Urban Development as a Fam· 
ily Relocation Advisor at a salary of $475 
a month. She has worked steadily since 
she was 16 years old, and has been employed 
full-time since she graduated from high 
school. During this entire period, the 
longest period she has not been working 
was for two months when she gave birth 
to her only child 8 years ago in a previous 
marriage. 
When she and her husband applied for a 
V.A. mortgage loan last fall, it was deter-
mined that in order to be able to qualify 
for the loan, it would be necessary that 
her income be counted. She was informed 
by the mortgage company, however, that 
V.A. would not count her income because 
she was "a woman of childbearing age." 
On the other hand, the mortgage company 
informed Mrs. Johnson that she could have 
her income counted if she either obtained 
a doctor's certificate stating that she 
could no longer have children or if she 
signed an affidavit stating that she is 
practicing birth control under the super-
vision of her physician and planned to 
continue to practice birth control and 
have no more children. The mortgage 
company even typed out and handed her 
its recommended version of the affidavit. 
When Mrs. Johnson rebelled at what she 
considered a blatant invasion of her rights, 
the official of the mortgage company 
stated this was a common practice and 
even showed her from the files, while blot· 
ting out the name, several other affidavits 
from women in a similar position as Mrs. 
Johnson. 
Mrs. Johnson refused to sign such an af-
fidavit and was denied the loan. This 
refusal to count Mrs. Johnson's income was 
particularly unconscionable because of the 
clear facts of her own work history and 
motivation. Not only had she been consist-
ently employed for 13 years, but she has 
found the time and energy to take enough 
night courses to total two years of college 
credit. As she continues to work for her 
degree, the opportunities for further job 
adva·ncement will continue to increase. 
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Before moving to Florida, Mrs. Johnson 
had owned a home herself in South 
Carolina and had a good payment record. 
Finally it should be noted that the apart-
ment Mr. and Mrs. Johnson currently 
reside in requires a monthly rent which 
is almost $50 more than the monthly 
payment that the mortgage would have 
required. The Johnsons have never had 
any difficulty in paying their rent. 
As Mrs. Johnson pointed out to me, she 
and her husband can't qualify for a Section 
235 loan because her income is counted as 
part of the family income, thus making 
their total family income too high. Yet at 
the same time they can't qualify for a V.A. 
loan because, for these purposes, her 
income is not counted.20 
It is important to note that the policy \\hich resulted 
in the Johnson's being denied the loan would not 
likely be revealed in a statistical survey of lending 
practices because many women yield to the pressure 
and sign affidavits in order to obtain a loan. 
3 F .ff.A. Practice 
The Federal Housing Administration (F.H.A.) has 
never had any policies, procedures or instructions 
specifically designed for determining the eligibility 
of female applicants. However, the F.H.A. has always 
had instructions for determining whether the income 
of a working wife will be counted toward support of 
the mortgage obligation.21 
Prior to October, 1965, the income of a young wife 
was not counted. The income of the husband alone 
had to suffice to support the mortgage. This policy 
was based on the belief that many working wives 
quit working after having their first child, either vol-
untarily or because few employers provided maternity 
leave with job retention rights.22 
Since October, 1965, the income of a majority of all 
working wives has been counted in support of the 
mortgage.23 F.H.A.'s underwriting manual emphasizes 
the substantial increase in wives' employment as a 
characteristic of family life, and with regard to young-
er couples, adds the following: 
This steadily increasing trend in wife 
employment as a characteristic of the 
family life of the younger couples seems 
attributable to the willingness of both 
husband and wife to work for a better 
standard of living during their early 
married life than would otherwise be 
possible.24 
With regard to the possibility of pregnancy, the F .H.A. 
manual states: 
The principal element of mortgage risk 
in allowing the income of working wives 
as effective income is the possibility of 
its interruption by maternity leave. Most 
employers recognize this possibility 
provide for maternity leave, with job 
.retention, as an inducement of employment. 
With strong motives for returning to work 
any failure to do so after maternity leave 
would probably be due to causes which 
would be unpredictable and would rep-
resent such a very small percentage of 
volume that it could be accepted as a 
calculated risk.25 
This policy change reflects a recognition of the trend 
of increased stability of the employment of working 
wives. This trend is indicated by F .H.A. statistics: in 
1964, the wife worked in 27% of the cases insured; 
this figure increased to 44% in 1970.26 Under present 
policy, a wife's income will be disallowed only where 
she has peen employed only a few months and the 
employment itself is not definitely established. Of 
all cases in which the wife worked, F.H.A. counted 
her income in 73% of the cases in 1964 and 89% of 
the cases in 1970. The 11 % in 1970 were not counted 
because they presented instances of uncertainty regard-
ing the wife's continued employment, for example, 
if she were young, recently married, and on her first 
job. Occasionally, an older working wife had an 
erratic employment pattern over· the years. 21 
The F.H.A. statistics may, however, underestimate the 
extent of persistent discrimination against women. The 
89% figure is 89% of the cases where loan applica-
tions were approved. F.H.A. does not keep statistics 
on characteristics of borrowers on rejected applications 
nor does it keep records analyzing the reasons for loan 
rejections. It is at least possible that despite the statis-
tics, F .H.A. fails to count the wife's income in a large 
number of cases and this fact is lost because rejection 
of the wife's income led to rejection of the entire loan 
application. The experience of officials in F .H.A.'s 
mortgage credit section indicates that this is not the 
case, 28 but there is presently no way to verify this 
claim. 
4 Secondary Market Programs 
The practice of income discounting by major institu-
tional lenders such as savings and loan associations is 
affected by developments in the national secondary 
market operations of the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (F.N.M.A.) and the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (F .H.L.M.C.). 
F.N.M.A. was authorized by the Emergency Home 
Finance act of 1970 to purchase and sell conventional 
169 
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mortgages in order to facilitate the flow of credit for 
residential mortgage financing. The same act created 
a second federal corporation, F.H.L.M.C., also to buy 
and sell conventional mortgages.29 F.N.M.A. deals 
primarily with mortgage bankers and commercial 
banks, while F .H.L.M.C. limits its operations to savings 
·and loan associtaions. 
Recognizing that the great diversity in mortgage instru-
ments, procedures, and underwriting criteria would be 
a barrier to the development of an effective secondary 
market, both F.N.M.A. and F.H.L.M.C. have devoted 
much effort to the establishment of standard mortgage 
forms and credit underwriting criteria to be used by 
lenders seeking to sell their mortgages to these 
agencies. 
In the first draft of its proposed criteria, F .N .M.A. 
recommended that the income of a working wife be 
counted at 50 per cent.30 F .N .M.A. officials believed 
this figure to be relatively generous by comparison to 
the typical policy of mortgage lenders. Under criticism 
by numerous organizations concerned with protecting 
the rights and interests of racial and ethnic minorities, 
working people, consumers, women and senior citizens, 
F.N.M.A. issued revised guidelines in December, 
1971.31 The discriminatory features of the earlier 
guidelines were deleted, and a prohibition on discrim-
ination on account of race, color, religion, sex, age 
or national origin in the fixing of terms of loans and 
in servicing loans was added. While eliminating the 
arbitrary 50 per cent rule F.N.M.A. left vague what 
standard should instead be applied. The operative 
language relating to the joint income of a husband 
and wife states: 
The key determination to be made is 
whether the circumstances reasonably 
indicate that the income, jointly or 
severally, will continue in a manner suf-
ficient to liquidate the debt under the 
terms of the note and mortgage.32 
The vagueness of this new language leaves open the 
possibility that many mortgage originators will inter-
pret anl:l apply it in a discriminatory manner. 
F.H.L.M.C. has issued more positive guidelines which 
state: 
If there are two borrowers both of whom 
have full time employment, a determination 
should be made as to whether both will 
probably work for several years (normally 
at least 20% of the mortgage term).33 
The guidelines make it clear that the possibility of 
temporary leave, such as maternity leave, is not a 
basis for discounting any portion of an applicant's 
income. Also, if either spouse has part-time work, the 
income it generates is to be counted if it is likely to be 
stable for three years. 
These guidelines may have a positive impact on the 
practices of many mortgage lenders. Mortgage bankers 
may feel reasonably confident that F .N .M.A. will not 
refuse to purchase a mortgage merely be~ause a liberal 
underwriting policy is followed in counting a working 
wife's income. Mortgage bankers in particular may be 
encouraged to change their current policies because. 
they make loans with the idea of selling them. To the 
extent they feel they have a reliable outlet for a mort-
gage, they will have less reason not to originate the · 
loan. 
The potential impact on savings and loan associations 
is less predictable. The secondary market is not as sig-
nificant to savings and loan associations because savings 
and loan associations generally originate mortgages with 
the idea of holding them as investments rather than 
selling them. It is only over the long term that the 
real potential for change in the policy of savings and 
loan associations can be realized. 
Change in institutional lending practices will depend 
on the extent to which F.N.M.A. and F.H.L.M.C. 
actually implement the policies they adopted in 
their guidelines. If these agencies were to refuse to 
purchase mortgages made on the basis of these revised 
criteria, mortgage lenders would cease to originate such 
loans. So far the agencies have only indicated they will 
purchase loans that are made under a non-discriminatory 
policy. They could take the further step of stating they 
will refuse to purchase loans from lenders who arbit-
rarily discount all or part of a working wife's income.34 
Such a stance would have the potential for significant 
immediate impact. 
B Single Women 
Another common form of discrimination against women 
in home mortgage financing is the practice of treating a 
single female loan applicant differently from a single 
male. There is little statistical data indicating the full 
extent of this problem, because the only agencies in a 
position to gather this data-the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board, the Comptroller of the Currency, the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation-have not 
collected and analyzed data on the sex of loan appli-
cants. 
However, the Bank Board's survey of lending practices35 
provides some evidence of the problems single women 
are likely to encounter when applying for a mortgage. 
While the questionaire did not ask directly whether the 
sex of an applicant was a factor in evaluating a loan 
application, it did ask if marital status was a factor. 
Almost 2/3 of the savings and loan associations re-
sponded that marital status was a factor in deciding on 
loan applications, and 18% said that a sufficiently 
un~atisfactory answer to the question about marital 
status would disqualify the applicant per se from receiv-
ing a loan.36 
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The Bank Board has not released the answers to a 
followup question which inquired what particular 
marital status would disqualify the applicant,37 so 
any interpretation of the statistics must be somewhat 
speculative. It seems clear, however, that applicants 
would not be disqualified because they were married 
and living together, so it must be that the disqualifying 
marital status must be in one or more of the following 
categories: single, divorced, widowed or separated. 
Discrimination on the basis of marital status harms 
women more than men because more women than men 
fall into these categories. According to the 1970 Census, 
14~ million women fall into the categories of separated, 
divorced and widowed, but only 5 million men.38 
Added to this is the fact that fewer single men than 
women seek home mortgages because men are less 
likely than women to have .children living with them. 
To the extent that men in these categories do not seek 
mortgages, therefore, discrimination on the basis of 
marital status may become the functional equivalent of 
discrimination on account of sex. 39 
Several witnesses before the National Commission on 
Consumer Finance testified to the prevalence of dis-
crimination against single women.40 One witness pre-
sented a particularly striking case history to the Com-
mission: 
This woman was 28 years old, divorced, the 
holder of a master's degree, and was earning 
a salary of $12,000 when she decided last 
summer to buy a $34,500 townhouse. With 
$9000 in cash and no debts, she was opti-
mistic about obtaining a loan. That optimism 
soon faded. She applied to several mortgage 
lenders in the district and received several 
rejections. Some explained that the area was 
risky, yet these same lenders had been recom-
mended by her realtor because they often 
made loans in that area. Another eventually 
rejected her application due to a suddenly 
discovered shortage of funds. The fact that 
she had no established credit was also a nega-
tive factor. Unfortunately, her credit appli-
cations had also been rejected by several 
credit card companies. 
This story does have a happy ending. After 
explaining her plight to an influential friend, 
this young woman got a little assistance. Her 
friend was on exceptionally good terms with 
the president of a local lending institution. A 
loan interview was set up with the president, 
and she soon had her loan. And after becom-
ing a homeowner, she found it much easier to 
obtain other types of credit. She now owns 
her own home, a car, and has several credit 
cards.41 
The troublesome question is: would there have been 
such a happy outcome for a less informed, less edu-
cated, and less wealthy woman who did not have 
influential friends? 
II The Economic Justification for Discrimination 
Against Women in Home Mortgage Financing 
A Income Discounting 
Lenders do not give the income of working wives full 
credit becau~e they assume the women are temporary 
workers. If a wife is of childbearing age and is not 
classed as a professional, little weight will usually be 
given to her income. Lenders typically reason that if 
her income were counted as a qualifying factor for the 
loan and she were to leave the labor force, the family's 
ability to support the mortgage would be impaired and 
the likelihood of default increased. 
This discounting policy is not justifiable on economic 
grounds for two major reasons. First, the probability of 
delinquency or default is not particularly sensitive to 
the percent of income devoted to housing expense. 
Second, the income of a working wife cannot in the 
majority of cases be expected to shrink or evaporate 
during the early years of the mortgage. 
Expense-to-Income Ratio 
Lenders generally believe that the percentage of income 
which a family spends on housing is an important 
determinant of loan risk. This is why lenders usually 
establish maximum ratios for housing expense to in-
come and will rarely make a loan which would produce 
a larger ratio. Although the standard varies.by lender 
and between areas of the country, the ratio is typically 
set at 20 or 25 per cent.42 Thus, an applicant whose 
income is $10,000:will be considered for a loan of no 
greater amount than will yield annual payments total-
ling $2,000-2,500. 
The average working couple, who in 1970 earned 
$13,259, of which the wife accounted for $3,473 or 
26.2%, would qualify for a loan requiring $276 in 
monthly housing expense from a lender operating 
under the 25% rule who counted the wife's income.43 
Were the wife then to leave the labor force, the ratio 
of housing expense to income would jump to 33.9%. 
Had the lender anticipated such a shift, he would not 
have made the loan. The question is: does such a shift 
really convert a sound loan into a risky loan? 
Recent research has begun to provide an answer. Ac-
cording to a study by John Herzog and James Earley 
for the National Bureau of Economic Research,44 the 
percentage of income spent on housing is not signifi-
cantly related to loan risk. Instead, the most important 
risk-governing factors were found to be the loan-to- · 
value ratio, the presence of junior financing, and the 
purpose of the loan.45 George von Furstenberg, author 
of several respected studies of F .H.A. and V.A. loans, 
similarly maintains that the loan-to-value ratio is the 
key determinant of loan quality.46 Other delinquency 
and foreclosure studies have been attempted by govern-
mental agencies and private groups. They conclude that 
171 
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factors other than the loan to income ratio best predict 
default, and indicate that this ratio is not an especially 
useful indicator.47 
Thus, to the extent that the housing expense-to-
income ratio is an unreliable indicator of risk, lenders 
relying on it are denying loans without an adequate 
economic justification. 
2 Likelihood of Wife's Income Terminating 
The second reason lenders discount a working wife's 
income is their belief that such income is likely to 
terminate during the early years of the mortgage. It 
appears, however, that this expectation is largely un-
founded. 
It is commonly acknowledged that the three major 
determinants of a wife's labor force status are: the 
family's child care needs (determined by the number 
and ages of any children), the wife's level of education 
and age, and the family's economic status (as measured 
by the husband's income).48 Of these factors, the fami-
ly's child care needs is most important.49 For several 
reasons, however, it is not accurate for a lender to 
assume that all wives will permanently leave the labor 
force due to the presence of children. 
First, wives who have no children generally continue to 
be labor force participants. About 2/3 of childless wives 
between the ages of 25 and 34, and 72 per cent of those 
between the ages of 20 and 24 were in the work force 
in 1969. 50 Wives who do not become mothers also have 
long worklife expectancies. A 30 year old working wife 
with no children can be expected to work 27 more 
years; if she is 35, her worklife is 24.4 years. 51 These 
figures make it clear there is no economic justification 
for discounting the income of a working wife who is 
unlikely to become a mother. 
Second, a substantial number of women return to work 
after their children have begun school. Half of all wives 
with children between the ages of 6 and 17 years of age 
were in the labor force in March, 1971.52 Among black 
mothers with school age children the proportion is 
2/3.53 A woman of 35 who has had her last child and 
has rejoined the labor force has a worklife expectancy 
of 24 more years. 54 These figures make it clear that the 
incomes of women who have completed their families 
and returned to work should be viewed as stable and 
that automatic discounting is economically unjustified. 
Third, in recent years there has been a marked increase 
in the labor force participation rates for mothers with 
pre-school children. In the last ten years the participa-
tion rates for young mothers (ages 20-24) rose from 
18 per cent to 33 per cent,55 and in 1971 29.6 per cent 
of wives with children under 6 years of age were in the 
labor force. 56 Although this participation rate is sub-
stantially lower than that of wives with school age 
children, it has been rising rapidly and may grow fur-
ther as improved child care opportunities are made 
available. These figures demonstrate that it is erroneous 
for a lender to discount a wife's income on the assump-
tion that she will necessarily leiwe the labor force if she 
has pre-school children. 
Although some wives do get pregnant and leave work, 
the question that needs to be answered is: how many 
wives will quit work and refuse to return to work if by 
so doing they will be unable to meet their mortgage 
payments and will allow a foreclosure on their mort-
gage? 
A study by the U.S. Savings and Loan League57 indi-
cates that loans to families where the husband's income 
accounted for 100% of family income actually had a 
higher likelihood of being delinquent than loans to 
families where the husband's income was only a portion 
of family income. 58 As the percentage of family income 
earned by the husband decreased, the likelihood of the 
loan's being delinquent also decreased. The study failed 
to control for a number of other variables that might 
predict delinquency but the results are very suggestive 
because the trend of recent years has been toward the 
increased reliability of the income of working wives. 
More importantly, it appears that if lenders were really 
concerned about screening out risky loans, they could 
easily refine the data received from applicants. The 
practice of automatically discounting a wife's income 
by 50, 75 or 100 per cent unless she is a professional 
is an extremely blunt administrative device that has the 
potential for being both overinclusive and underin-
clusive. It is overinclusive when it results in the dis-
counting of the income of a woman who would in fact 
be a reliable labor force participant throughout the 
term of the mortgage. It is underinclusive when it re-
sults in counting the income of an older, professional 
wife who nevertheless intends to stop working and have 
children. Coupled with the fact that the housing ex-
pense-to-income ratio may be an unreliable determin-
ant of risk, it is clear that lenders need to develop 
more sensitivity to the changing roles of women in our 
society and to solicit more precise data from applicants 
in order to evaluate more fairly the likelihood of de-
fault or foreclosure. 
B Treatment of Single Women 
The policy which treats single women differently from 
single or married men is likewise not justifiable on 
economic grounds. 
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A single woman is regarded as a poor risk for two 
reasons: 
she is assumed to have less regard for her 
obligations than, say, a married man; and 
2 it is thought likely she will leave the 
labor force and be unable to support the 
mortgage.59 
There are several reasons for doubting the validity of 
these assumptions. 
First, it appears that the credit reliability of women is 
superior to that of men, and there seems to be no dif-
ference in risk between married and single borrowers.00 
Moreover, the Herzog and Earley study supports the 
conclusion that marital status is unrelated to delin-
quency and foreclosure risk.61 Hence, there is no reason 
to conclude that single women tend to treat their obli-
gations more lightly than others. 
Second, the majority of single women are in the labor 
force, and single women who remain single have parti-
cularly long worklife expectancies. Based on 1960 
census data, a woman entering the workforce by age 20 
who never marries can be expected to work for 45 
years, a longer worklife than the average man. Women 
who are -divorced· or widowed and working at age 35 
can also be expected to work for a long time-divorcees 
for 29 more years and widows for 27 more years.62 
Thus, if a woman applicant can be expected to remain 
single, the lender has no reason to regard her income as 
less stable than that of a married man. Whether she can 
be expected to marry depends primarily on her age, 
with the probability dropping substantially after age 
30.63 
Third, the changes most likely to occur in a young 
woman's marital and work force status will not gener-
ally result in a depletion of the income supporting her 
mortgage. When the loan applicant is young, the prob-
abilities are greater that she will marry. But none of the 
probable consequences of marriage increase the riski-
ness of her loan. If a female mortgagor marries, she and 
her husband may choose to live elsewhere and sell or 
rent the property. Whether she continues to work is 
then much less important to the lender. If her house is 
used as the family residence, it will probably be con-
verted to joint tenancy with the husband cosigning the 
note. Thus, if the wife continued to work, the mortgage 
would be supported by two incomes rather than one, 
hardly a cause of concern to the mortgagee. If the wife 
were to leave the labor force, it is probable that the 
substitution of her husband's income would result in 
a lower payment-to-income ratio because men generally 
have higher paying jobs. 
For a lender to reject a single woman's application 
without analyzing in detail the specifics of her particu-
lar situation therefore appears to be wholly without 
economic justification. 
C Business Practices of Lenders 
The materials discussed above indicate that the dis-
criminatory practices of mortgage lenders are notjusti-
fied on economic grounds. Nevertheless, lenders com-
monly argue that fully counting a wife's income and 
making loans to women on the same basis as men con-
stitute unsound business practices. Until this notion is 
disspelled, lenders will continue discriminating against 
women in home mortgage financing. 
Indeed, bias against female loan applicants does not 
constitute a sound business practice. A group of 180 
economists stated: 
Arbitrary exclusion of persons who have the 
economic capacity to participate in the mar· 
ket place is a distortion of our economic 
system and cannot be considered 'sound 
and economical home financing'.64 
By relying on discriminatory lending practices, lenders 
deny themselves potentially profitable loans, arbitrarily 
limiting their market choice.65 Discrimination for non-
economic reasons is really an unsafe and unsound busi-
ness practice because: 
it results in an economic cost not only to 
those discriminated against but also to those 
who do the discriminating. 66 
Thus it is error to maintain that lenders would be doing 
their investor-shareholders a disservice by making more 
loans to women and counting a working wife's income. 
Lenders would do their owners and their country more 
of a service by evaluating loan applications on the basis 
of those factors studies have shown to be directly re-
lated to risk, and not on the basis of outmoded images 
of the behavior of women in our society.67 
III The Need for State Legislation 
Strictly enforced federal and state legislation is needed 
to provide an adequate legal remedy for the victims of 
discrimination in obtaining home mortgage financing. 
Legislation is needed because there exist no adequate 
federal statutory, executive, administrative or constitu-
tional remedies. The Equal Rights Amendment is not 
yet law and it is not immediately clear that it would 
provide an adequate remedy even if adopted. Nor, is 
there presently a satisfactory remedy under most state 
laws. 
A Federal Remedies 
Statutory Remedies 
There is presently no federal statutory provision that 
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prohibits discrimination against women in home mort-
gage financing. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
forbids the discrimination against the beneficiaries of 
federally assisted programs, but it applies only to dis-
crimination on the basis of race, color and national 
origin-not sex.68 Title VII of the same act prohibits 
employers, including banks, from discriminating on the 
basis of race, color, religion, national origin and sex, 
but applies only to employment.69 The Civil Rights Act 
of 1968 prohibits discrimination in housing lending on 
the basis of race, creed, color and national origin-but 
not sex.70 
Legislation which would strike at discrimination against 
women in home mortgage financing has been intro-
duced in Congress by Representative Abzug of New 
York. Her bill 71 would prohibit discrimination by finan-
cial institutions or any other persons on the basis of 
marital status or sex in connection with federally-
related mortgage transactions. As an aid to effective 
enforcement, it would also require any parties to any 
such transaction to submit appropriate reports thereon 
containing specified information. Also, it provides for 
both civil and criminal liabilities. The bill was referred 
to the House Committee on Banking and Currency 
where it failed to receive a favorable report. It has been 
reintroduced in the 93d Congress. 
2 Executive Remedies 
Federal executive remedies are also inadequate. Execu-
tive Order 11246 covers banks (who are federal con-
tractors because of their relationship with the Federal 
Reserve), prohibiting discrimination against women and 
other minorities, but only with respect to employ-
ment.72 
3 Administrative Remedies 
The banking and savings and loan industries are among 
the most heavily regulated industries in the United 
States. Many aspects of the activities of lending institu-
tions are supervised by various administrative agencies 
in an effort to promote a variety of social and economic 
objectives. 73 To date, however, none of these agencies 
has promulgated regulations or guidelines prohibiting 
discrimination against women in home mortgage financ-
ing. The only guidelines presently in use which bear on 
the matter are those established by the F.H.A. and 
F.H.L.M.C.,74 and these lack effective enforcement 
mechanisms. 
One should note that the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation has recently proposed regulations barring 
discrimination in real estate lending,75 but they do not 
cover discrimination on the basis of sex. A coalition of 
several public interest groups has petitioned 76 the 
F.D.I.C. to amend the guidelines to prohibit sex dis-
crimination as well, but no change has yet been made. 
4 Constitutional Remedies 
Finally, a judicial remedy seems unavailable because 
judicial interpretation of the Equal Prote<;tion Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment is unlikely to bar dis-
crimination against women in h.ome mortgage financing. 
The Supreme Court has held that the Equal Protection 
Clause is applicable to discrimination on the basis of· 
sex,77 but has thus far failed to designate sex differ-
entiation cases as ones appropriate for strict scrutiny. 
In sex discrimination cases, the Supreme Court has not 
yet found the occasion to apply the "fundamental 
interest" test or the "suspect classification" formula.78 
The fundamental interest test applies only where the 
particular right claimed to be infringed is a "funda-
mental" one; the Court is divided as to what kinds of 
rights and interests are sufficiently "fundamental" to 
.warrant strict scrutiny. 79 Nonetheless, the fundamental 
interest test would likely not be applied to any but the 
most important areas in which women are treated dif-
ferently from men, such as voting and employment. 
When a statute classifies on a basis "inherently suspect" 
the Court has said it will apply "the most rigid scru-
tiny"BO to the enactment. Thus, a statute distinguishing 
on the basis of race or ancestry embodies a "suspect" 
or "invidious" classification and, unless supported by 
the most compelling affirmative justification, will not 
pass constitutional muster.81 The Court refused.to. . 
apply the suspect classification test in one sex d1scnm1-
nation case,82 however, though appellant relied pri-
marily on this line of arguement 83 and the similarities 
between race and sex discrimination are striking.84 
Thus it appears unlikely that the Court will subject 
legislation to strict scrutiny because it classifies on the 
basis of sex.85 
B The Equal Rights Amendment 
It is possible that the adoption of the proposed Equal 
Rights Amendment BG would make unconstitutional 
discrimination against women in home mortgage 
financing. For several reasons, however, state and 
federal legislation should nevertheless be enacted. 
First, the Equal Rights Amendment has not been rati-
fied by the requisite number of states. For this pro-
posed amendment to become law, three-fourths of the 
states must ratify it within seven years of its passage by 
Congress. This means that 38 states must ratify the 
proposed Amendment by March 22, 197~ .. As of April, 
1973, the legislatures of 28 states had ratified the pro-
posal. 
Second, even if the Equal Rights Amendment were 
ratified by the requisite number of states, it would not 
take effect for another two years.87 Thus, if the ratifi-
cation process were to slow down, the Amen~m.ent. 
might not be in operation before 1980. ~isc.nmma~1on 
against women in home mortgage financing 1s a senous 
enough problem to warrant a quicker response. 
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Third, it is problematical whether the Equal Rights 
Amendment, even if ratified in time, would reach this 
type of discrimination. The Amendment provides that 
equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged 
"by the United States or by any State". Like the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the legal effect of 
the Amendment is confined to "state action". How 
this much-debated and increasingly complex legal con-
cept would be applied in the context of women's 
rights remains to be seen. 
Constitutional doctrines pertaining to state action, devel-
oped primarily in the context of racial discrimination, 
embody two concepts: 
that the existence of state action de-
pends on the nature and degree of state 
involvement; and 
2 that state action depends on the function 
being performed. 
The degree of state involvement may range all the way 
from a direct prohibition of certain conduct to the 
maintenance of conditions in the society that permit 
private activity to exist. The type of function may 
range from a clearly governmental activity, such as the 
election of public officials, to purely personal relation-
ships, such as private social gatherings.as 
The problem is to determine whether the activity of 
home mortgage financing is part of the public sector, 
in which different treatment on account of sex would 
be prohibited, or is part of the private sector, in which 
different treatment would be permitted. Supporting its 
inclusion in the public sector would be the presence of 
pervasive federal and state regulation of the banking 
and savings and loan industries. The Supreme Court's 
recent holding in the Moose Lodge case, 89 however, 
indicates that such a conclusion is questionable. In 
Moose Lodge, a Negro guest of a member of the Lodge, 
a private club, was refused service in the club's dining 
room and bar solely because of his race. In suing for 
injunctive relief, he contended that the discrimination 
was state action, and thus a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
because the state liquor board had issued the club a 
private club liquor license. The District Court found 
state action in what it considered to be the "pervasive" 
nature of the regulation of private clubs by the state 
liquor board.90 The Supreme Court reversed, stating: 
However detailed this type of regulation may 
be in some particulars, it cannot be said to in 
any way foster or encourage racial discrimina-
tion. Nor can it be said to make the state in 
any realistic sense a partner or even a joint 
venturer in the club's enterprise.91 
Justice Rehnquist stated the general test as follows: 
Our holdings indicate that where the impetus 
for the discrimination is private, the State 
must have "significantly involved itself with 
invidious discrimination," Reitman v. Mulkey, 
387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967), in order for the 
discriminatory action to fall within the ambit 
of the constitutional prohibition. 92 
It is unclear whether federal and state regulation of 
banks and savings and loan associations provides the 
necessary state action. On the one hand, such regulation 
probably cannot be said to encourage sex discrimination, 
and the situation would be analogous to that in Moose 
Lodge. On the other hand, a bank or savings and loan 
association is a much more public organization than a 
private social club and the activity of originating mort-
gage loans has a much broader impact than the serving 
of liquor. 
The question is further clouded by the fact that dis-
crimination on the basis of sex has not yet received as 
much n.ational attention as discrimination on the basis 
of race. It is possible that the Court could find state 
action in a racial discrimination case and not find state 
action on analogous facts in a sex discrimination case. 
The concept of state action should be vigorously ap-
plied up to the point necessary to achieve the object-
ives of the Equal Rights Amendment if it is adopted. 
But it is not possible at this point, to predict with any 
certainty how those objectives will be viewed by courts 
over the years. 93 
Even if sex discrimination by lenders is found to be 
state action under a newly enacted Equal Rights Amend-
ment, a statutory enactment may still be in order. 
Enforcement of a constitutional prohibition is a much 
more protracted and uncertain process than enforce-
ment of a well-drafted statute. Litigation is invariably a 
lengthy process. If the Supreme Court gave priority to 
cases dealing with other areas of women's rights, such 
as employment rights, protective labor legislation, or 
alimony, decisions on discrimination in home mortgage 
financing could be years away. Such delay is not 
likely in the enforcement of a statute. 
C State Remedies 
There is no remedy currently available under the laws 
of most states. The Illinois state constitution prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of sex in employment and 
the rental or sale of property ,94 and provides that the 
equal protection of the laws shall not be denied or 
abridged on account of sex by the state or any of its 
units of local government.95 The Hawaii state con-
stitution provides that no person shall be discriminated 
against in the exercise of his civil rights because of sex.96 
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The enjoyment of civil and political rights is not pro-
tected in all state constitutions, however, and among 
those which include the provision, most do not prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of sex. 97 
Several states have enacted legislation prohibiting dis-
crimination on the basis of sex in housing and housing 
financing. 98 However, many of these statutes are pub-
lic accommod<ltion laws and do not specifically pro-
hibit discrimination in mortgage lending.99 Several 
other states presently have statutes pending in their 
legislatures and Washington state has recently amended 
its human rights legislation to cover real estate trans-
actions.100 More legislation is needed, however, to 
combat effectively the various forms of discrimination 
against women in home mortgage financing. 
D Features of a Proposed Statute 
The Appendix contains a statute designed to prohibit 
discrimination against persons on the basis of sex or 
marital status in any credit transaction. Discrimination 
on the basis of marital status is prohibited because it 
would have a discriminatory impact on women since 
more women than men are separated, divorced, or 
widowed. 
Following the pattern of other antidiscrimination stat-
utes, the term "discrimination" is not explicitly defined. 
It is understood that the Fourteenth Amendment's 
"equal protection" standard should be used to evaluate 
creditor practices. Thus a prima facie case of sex dis-
crimination would be established when a person showed 
that a procedure, practice, or act complained of affects 
a person of a particular sex differently than it affects a 
person who, except for sex or marital status, is similarly 
situated. 
The statute prohibits "creditors" from such discrimina-
tion, with the definition of creditor parallelling that in 
the Federal Truth in Lending Act. The statute is not 
designed to provide state control over federally charter-
ed and licensed financial institutions. 
All phases of a credit transaction would be covered by 
the statute, including any advertising by a creditor 
designed to encourage application for credit, the appli-
176 cation itself, all acts incident to the evaluation of an 
application, and the actual credit sale. 
The statute provides for a variety of enforcement 
measures. First, the Banking Commissioner or 
other similarly situated state official, is given extensive 
powers to promulgate such regulations as are necessary 
to carry out the purposes of the act, to receive and act 
on complaints, to seek voluntary compliance with the 
act, to require records to be maintained by creditors 
sufficient to demonstrate compliance with the act, and 
to issue cease and desist orders against any creditor not 
in compliance with the act. He may also institute pro-
grams to educate persons with respect to credit practices 
and problems, and make studies appropriate to carry out· 
the purposes of the act. He is given general subpoena 
powers and may request the Attorney General to enjoin 
any violation of the act or regulations adopted thereun-
der. 
Second, any person discriminated against by a creditor 
may bring an action to recover damages, plus costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees. 
Third, there is criminal liability for any creditor, or 
creditor's officer, director, or employee who willfully 
and knowingly violated the act. 
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A Bill 
An Act prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex or 
marital status in credit transactions. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives 
in General Assembly convened: 
Section 1 Definitions 
As used in this Act: 
(a) "Commissioner" means the Bank Commissioner; 
(b) "credit" means the right granted by a creditor to a 
person to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and de-
fer its payment; 
(c) "creditor" means any person who regularly extends 
or arranges for the extension of credit for which the pay-
ment of a finance charge or interest is required whether 
in connection with loans, sale of property or services or 
otherwise. The provisions of this Act apply to any such 
creditor, irrespective of his or its status as a natural per-
son or any type of organization; 
(d) "invitation to apply for credit" means any com-
munication, oral or written, by a creditor which encour-
ages or prompts an application for credit; 
(e) "application for credit" means any communication, 
oral or written, by a person to a qeditor requesting an 
extension of credit to that person or to any other person, 
and includes any procedure involving the renewal or al-
teration of credit privileges or the changing of the name 
of the person to whom credit is extended; 
(f) "extension of credit" means all acts incident to the 
evaluation of an application for credit and the granting 
of credit; 
(g) "credit sale" means any transaction with respect 
to which credit is granted; 
(h) "credit transaction" means any invitation to apply 
for credit, application for credit, extension of credit or 
credit sale. 
Section 2 Prolu"bited Discrimination 
It shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate on 
the basis of sex or marital status against any person in 
any credit transaction. 
Section 3 Enforcement. Commissioner's Powers Duties 
(a) The Commissioner shall (1) issue such regulations 
as are deemed necessary to further the purposes of this 
Act, (2) receive and act on complaints, (3) take action 
designed to obtain voluntary compliance with this Act, 
and ( 4) commence proceedings on his own initiative; 
(b) In order to accomplish the purposes of this Act, 
the Commissioner may (1) counsel persons and groups 
on their rights and duties under this Act, (2) establish 
programs for the education of persons with respect to 
credit practices and problems, and (3) make studies 
appropriate to effectuate the purposes and policies of 
this Act and make the results available to the public; 
(c) The Commissioner may by regulation require the 
maintenance of records related to credit transactions 
sufficient to evidence the adoption of policies calculated 
to produce compliance with this Act and the Commis-
sioner or any authorized representative may examine 
such records on the premisses of the creditor, and make 
copies thereof; 
(d) The Commissioner may request the Attorney 
General to bring an action in the [Superior Court] to 
enjoin any person from violating this Act or regulations 
adopted pursuant to this Act; . 
( e) The Commissioner shall report annually to the Gov-
ernor on this administration of this Act. For that purpose 
the Commissioner is authorized to conduct research and 
make appropriate studies. The report shall include a des-
cription of the procedures and policies of his office; the 
policies followed in deciding whether to examine creditors 
subject to this Act; a statement of the types of credit 
discrimination problems of both creditors and debtors 
which have come to his attention; the disposition of such 
problems under existing law, and if any involved criminal 
prosecution, the reason his administrative powers were 
inadequate to solve them; and a general statement of the 
activities of his office. The report shall not identify the 
persons against whom he has taken action. 
(f) After a hearing held upon not less than ten nor 
more than thirty days' notice, the Commissioner may 
order a creditor or a person acting in behalf of a creditor 
to cease and desist from engaging in violations of this 
Act, and in that connection he may exercise the sub-
poena powers contained [elsewhere in the general sta· 
tutes] . Any person aggrieved by an order to the Com-
missioner under this subsection may appeal in the man-
ner provided [elsewhere in the general statutes]. 
Section 4 Civil Liability 
Any creditor who discriminates on the basis of sex or 
marital status against any person in any credit trans-
action shall be liable to that person in an amount equal 
to the sum of: 
(a) any specific damages, except that the liability 
under this paragraph shall not be less than one hundred 
dollars in any individual action; and 
(b) in the case of any successful action to enforce the 
foregoing liability, the costs of the action together with 
a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court. 
Section 5 Oiminal Liability 
(a) Any creditor who willfully and knowingly violates 
the provisions of Section 2 of this Act shall be f'med not 
more than five thousand dollars for each violation. 
(b) Any director, officer or employee of any creditor 
who willfully and knowingly violates the provisions of 
Section 2 of this Act shall be fined not more than five 
thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than six months, 
or both, for each violation. 
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On the other hand, it is likely that the results 
considerably understate the extent of discrim-
inatory lending practices. The Board's 
methodology was to send out the questionnaire 
to the 100 associations considered most likely 
to cooperate (Rohde, supra n. 3 at 5-6). The 
74 respondents have, compared to the rest 
of the industry, relatively liberal lending 
policies as measured by their willingness to 
participate in federal subsidy and insurance 
programs. For example, 58% of the respond-
ents claimed they made 90% loans to 
families in low-income or minority-group 
neighborhoods, and 2/3 would make 95% 
loans if permitted. Also, 40% said they made 
H.0.A.P. loans, 58% made loans in HUD or 
state-financed subsidized housing programs, 
and 30% indicated an interest in purchasing 
participations in loans on subsidized housing 
(Federal Home Loan Bank Board Survey, 
supra n. 17). It is instructive that of the 
savings and loan associatiOns thought by the 
Bank Board to be willing to cooperate and 
·evidencing liberal lending patterns in other 
areas, a vast majority nevertheless would auto-
matically discount the income of a working 
wife. 
Another reason the survey may tend to under-
state the extent of discriminatory lending 
practices is the fact that the specific question 
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response. First, the woman in the hypotheti- 43 Id. 
cal had two school age children and no pre-
school children, hence there had been a number 
of years since she had her last child, minimizing 
44 J. Herzog and J. Earley, Home Mortgage 
Delinquency and Foreclosure (1970). 
the likelihood of her having additional children. 
Second, she had a full-time job which apparent- 45 
ly had required some degree of training. There 
is nothing in the question to suggest that she 
was likely, even temporarily, to leave the labor 
force. Yet only 22 % of the lenders responding 
to the questionnaire would give full credit to 
her income. 
Id. at 50-52, 54, 58-60, 62-63. The fact 
at 213. 19 McElhone, supra n. 2 at 3. 
that the payment-to-income ratio variable. 
tested out as a statistically non-significant 
factor in determining delinquency and fore-
closure risk was a surprise to the authors who 
expected it to vary directly with such risk. 
They point out in their analysis (at 51) that 
the fact that this variable did not appear 
related to risk could be evidence that lenders 
have been successful in controlling this aspect 
of risk. Since the sample included only those 
loans which had been made and therefore 
passed the screening process of lenders who 
may have used the 20-25 per cent rule, it is 
theoretically possible that loans with danger-
ously high ratios were already filtered out. 
Were that the case, the observed results would 
be only the random variability in the ratio 
rather than variability which would be indic-
ative of risk. However, the fact remains that 
the payment-to-income ratio variable failed 
13 Id. 20 
14 B. Meltzer, Washington Post, Feb. 13, 1971 21 
at D9. 
15 Rohde, supra note 3 at 4. 
16 E.g., interview with loan interviewer at 
Connecticut Savings Bank, New Haven, Conn., 
Nov. 10, 1972; interview with loan officer 22 
at First New Haven National Bank, New Haven, 
Conn., Nov. 10, 1972. 23 
17 Federal Home Loan Bank Board Survey of 
100 Savings and Loan Associations, Summer, 24 
1971. 
18 Id. The Bank Board has attempted to 25 
minimize the significance of these results by 
pointing out that only 74 savings and loan 26 
associations responded to the survey, and that 
they were not selected by any scientific sam- 27 
piing technique so the results cannot be 
regarded as necessarily representative of the 28 
industry. (Letter from J. McElhone to the 
author, Nov. 9, 1972; Rohde, supra n.3 at 5). 29 
Rohde, supra n. 3 at 6-7. 
Testimony of Q. Wells, Director, Office of 
Technical and Credit Standards, Housing Pro-
duction and Mortgage Credit, Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, before the 
National Commission on Consumer Finance, 
May 23, 1972 at 1. 
Id. 
F.H.A.'s policy is to count either all of a 
wife's income or none of it. 
VII F.H.A. Underwriting Manual, Home 
Mortgages, § 71924. 
Id. 
Wells, supra note 21 at 1. 
Id. at 2. 
Rohde, supm note 3 at 22. 
84 Stat. 450 (1970). 
to satisfy the significance.tests at either the 1 % 
or 5% levels when the equations were pooled 
(at 54 ), making it highly unlikely that the 
ratio is a reliable indicator of risk. 
46 McElhone, supra note 2 at 10. 
47 AV.A. study published in 1962 (V.A. 
Report of Loan Service and Claims Study, 
Washington, D.C., April, 1962) covered all V.A. 
guaranteed loans in default as of December 31, 
1960 plus all new defaults reported during the 
first four months of 1961. It concluded that 
claims appeared to be directly related to longer 
initial term-to-maturity and loan-to-value ratio. 
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An F.H.A. study published early in 1963 
(F.H.A., F.H.A. Experience with Mortgage 
Foreclosures and Property Acquisitions, Wash., 
D.C., Jan. 1963) was based on several types 
of analysis, concluding that the age of loan, 
the price of the house, the size Q_f the down 
payment and the term of the loan were impor-
tant factors in determining whether fore-
closure would occur. It also concluded that 
borrower characteristics were more important 
than property and location characteristics but 
failed to test for the sex of the borrower as a 
factor. 
A study published by the Housing and Home 
Finance Agency in 1963 (H.H.F.A., Mortgage 
Foreclosures in Six Metropolitan Areas, Wash., 
D.C., June, 1963) was based on a survey of 
six metropolitan areas from 1961to1962. It 
concluded that the number of foreclosures was 
positively affected by loan-to-value ratio, term 
of loan, age of loan, presence of junior financ-
ing, and housing expense-to-income ratio. 
Finally, the United States Savings and Loan 
League conducted a national survey (U.S.S. and 
L.L., Anatomy of the Residential Mortgage, 
Chicago, 1964) covering 38 institutions. It 
found that those loans most prone to 
delinquency exhibited a high loan-to-value 
ratio or a high purchase price or a situation in 
which the borrower had a larger number of 
dependents. 
None of these studies is as helpful as the Herzog 
and Earley study in analyzing the riskiness of 
loans which rely on a wife's income for their 
support. The government studies, for example, 
concentrated only on foreclosure as a perform-
ance indicator, making no attempt to analyze 
what factors might be associated with delinquen 
cy. Nor was there much effort to determine 
why some delinquencies resulted in foreclosure 
and some did not. On the other hand, the 
Savings and Loan League study looked at the 
causes of delinquency but ignored foreclosure 
altogether. 
The findings also are difficult to evaluate in 
going from one study to another because they 
were based on different methods of statistical 
analysis. For example, in the H.H.F.A. report, 
the analysis was confined almost exclusively 
to simple frequency distributions of the 
characteristics of the loans foreclosed. Whether 
the distributions represented anything other 
than the distribution of all loans, good and bad, 
is impossible to tell from the study. In addition 
the studies performed no significance testing, 
used small samples, and defined variables in a 
variety of ways. Finally, the study with the 
best data base, the Savings and Loan League 
study, made no attempt to investigate the 
causes of foreclosure: but centered its attention 
on loan, property and borrower characteristics 
in general and the difference in those charac-
teristics for current loans versus delinquent 
loans. 
On the other hand, the Herzog and Earley study 
tried to remedy these research shortcomings. 
Its research strategy was to study loan delin-
quency as well as foreclosure, to use sample 
data for good as well as bad loans, to cover 
conventional as well as F.H.A. and V.A. loans, 
and to study the loans made by each of three 
major types of mortgage lenders. Multiple 
regression analysis, supplemented by Lorenz-
type tests of the "risk indexes" developed from 
the regressions, was used as the framework for 
the study. 
Thus the results of the Herzog and Earley study . 
deserve special weight in evaluating the validity 
of the economic rationale commonly given by 
lenders for discounting a working wife's income. 
48 McElhone, supra note 2 at 14; Back-
ground-Paper for Twentieth Century Fund 
Task Force on Working Women (unpublished 
and untitled), Chapter 1 at 5-8. 
49 McElhone, supra note 2 at 14. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of 
Population: 1970, General Social and Econom-
ic Characteristics, Final Report PC(l)-Cl 
United States Summary, Table 101: Employ-
ment Status by Sex and Size of Place: 1970 
at 1-407; 1912ManpowerReportofthePres-
ident, supra note 8 at 195. See also Waldman, 
supra note 4 at 20. 
53 McElhone, supra note 2 at 15. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 16. 
56 Sources cited, supra note 51. 
57 U.S. Savings and Loan League Study, supra 
note 48. · 
58 Id. at 66. 
59 McElhone, supra note 2 at 6. 
60 D. Durand, Risk Elements in Consumer 
Installment Financing, (1941), 74-75. 
61 Herzog and Earley, supra note 44 at 52, 
59-60, 62. 
62 U.S. Department of Labor, Manpower 
Administration, "Work Life Expectancy and 
Training Needs of Women," Manpower Report 
No. 12 (May, 1967), cited in U.S. Department 
of Labor, Women's Bureau, 1969 Handbook on 
Women Workers, at 7. 
63 McElhone, supra note 2 at 11. 
64 "Statement of Economists" (March 20, 
1972) at 1. The statement was endorsed, 
66 "Statement of Economists", supra note 
71 at 1. 
67 Throughout this discussion the assumptions 
have been honored that delinquencies and fore-
closures are unprofitable events, that lenders 
suffer significant economic losses when loans 
go bad, and that they are justified in avoiding 
any loan which may be risky. Such assump-
tions may not be true in fact. It is possible 
for a lender to profit from a bad loan by 
buying the foreclosed property at a deflated 
price and selling it later at a substantially 
higher price. There is a cost represented by 
the loss of reputation or goodwill that would 
accrue to a lender who made a high number of 
loans that went bad (see McElhone, supra 
note 2 at 7-8). On the other hand, if 
national policy supports the making of loans 
to risky borrowers, such as minority groups 
in traditionally risky neighborhoods, the 
lender may be under an affirmative obligation 
to make risky loans. Should the issue of dis-
crimination against women in home mortgage 
financing come to national prominence it is 
not inconceivable that lenders would be en-
couraged to make objectively risky loans in 
order to rectify an unfortunate past practice. 
68 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1964). 
69 42 U.S.C. §§ ~OOOe to 2000e-12 (1964). 
70 42 u.s.c. § 3605. 
71 H.R. 15114, 92nd Congress, 2d Sess.(1972). 
72 Executive Order No. 11246 as amended by 
Exec. Order No. 11375, 3 C.F.R. 402. 
71 H.R. 15114, 92nd Congress, 2d Sess. 
(1972). 
72 Executive Order No. 11246 as amended 
by Exec. Order No. 113 7 5, 3 C.F .R. 402. 
73 Rohde, supra note 5. The Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board oversees and examines the 
nation's savings and loan associations; ~he 
Comptroller of the Currency supervises and 
examines national banks; the Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System super-
vises and examines state chartered banks that 
are members of the Federal Reserve System; 
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora· 
tion performs the same function over state 
chartered banks that are F .D.l.C. insured but 
are not members of the Federal Reserve System. 
The nation's mortgage bankers are the only 
major class of mortgage originators that are 
not covered by the federal reguliitory scheme. 
74 Text accompanying footnotes 29-34, supra. 
75 Proposed F.D.I.C. Regs. §§ 338.1-338.8, 
37 Fed. Reg. 19385 (Sept. 20, 1972). 
among others, by the last five chairmen of the 
President's Council of Economic Advisers: Paul 76 
McCracken, Arthur Okun, Gardner Ackley, 
Petition, supra note 5. 
Walter Heller and Raymond Saulnier. 
65 G. Becker, The Economics of Discrim-
ination (1957). 
77 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
78 B. Brown, T.I. Emerson, G. Falk, A. 
Freedman, 'The Equal Rights Amendment: 
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A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for 
Women," 80 Yale L.J. 872, 879-80 (1971). 
79 Id. at 880. 
80 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 
216 (1944). 
81 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 
(1911);McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 
(1964); Takahashi v. Fish and Game Com-
mission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948). 
82 Reed v. Reed, supra note 84. Jn this case 
the Supreme Court unanimously declared un-
constitutional an Idaho statute that gave men 
preference over women in administering 
deceased persons' estates. 
83 Brief for Appellant, Reed v. Reed, 404 
U.S. 71 (1971). 
84 Note, "Sex Discrimination and Equal Pro-
may rest upon particular characteristics of the 
persons affected, such as credit worthiness or 
likelihood of employment termination, but 
under the Amendment the existence of such 
a characteristic to a greater degree in one sex 
does not justify classification by sex rather 
than by the particular characteristic. Thus, 
lenders who discounted the income of a work-
ing wife or treated a single woman differently 
from a man without reference to the specific 
characteristic of that wife or single woman 
that they reasonably believed contributed to 
the riskiness of the loan would be violating 
the Amendment. 
94 Ill. Const., Art. 1, § 1 7. 
95 Id., § 4. 
96 Hawaii Const., Art. 1, § 4. 
97 See, e.g., Conn. Const., Art. 1, § 20; N.Y. 
Const., Art. 1, § 11; Mich. Const., Art. 1, § 2. 
tection: Do We Need A Constitutional Amend-
ment?" 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1499, 1507-9 (1971). 98 Colo. Rev. Stats., 69-7-5(b) and (c); Idaho 
Code, 67-5909 (7) and (8); Ind. Stats., 40-2308 
(a) and (b); Kan. Stats., 44-1001, 1016, 1017; 
Laws of Mass., 151B, §4 (3B), (6) and (7); 
85 Even if the Court were to designate the 
ability to obtain a home mortgage a fundament-
al interest or sex a suspect classification, it 
.does not follow that all treatment differing by 
sex would be outlawed. All these categories 
do is place the party doing the discriminating 
in the position of showing a more compelling 
reason than usual for the differentiation. 
Although the standard of proof is higher, it 
inay theoretically still be met. 
86 Section 1. Equality of rights under the law 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United 
States or by any State on account of sex. 
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power 
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect 
two years after the date of ratification. 
House Joint Resolution 208, March 22, 1972, 
U.S. Code, Cong. and Admin. News, 92nd 
Cong., 2nd Sess. at 835. 
87 Id., § 3. 
88. Brown, et al., supra note 85 at 905. 
89 Moose Lodge No. JO 7 v. Irv is, 407 U.S. 
163 (1972). 
90 lrvis v. Moose Lodge No. 107, 318 F. 
Supp. 1246, 1248-50 (Pa. 1970). 
91 Moose Lodge, supra note 97 at 176-7. 
92 Id. at 173. 
93 If state action were found, the practice 
of income discounting and the differing 
treatment of single women would both 
violate the Equal Rights Amendment. The 
basic principle of the Amendment is that 
sex is not a permissible factor in determining 
the rights of any person (Brown, et al., supra 
note 85 at 889). Differentiation in treatment 
N.H. Rev. Stats., 354-A: 8(V); N.J. Stats., 10: 5-
12(g), (h) and (i); N.Y. Exec. Law, § 296.S(e); 
Penn. Stats., 43-955(h)(l) and (2); S.Dak. 
Comp. Laws, 20-13-20, 21. 
99 Cf Laws of Mass., 151B, §4 (3B), (6) and 
(7) to N.H. Rev. Stats., 354-A: 8(V). 
100 The states include Connecticut, Georgia, 
New York, and Texas. Telephone interview 
with S. Campbell, National N.O.W., March 
21, 1973. 
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